Peace Archives

UNSCR 1325: Lessons from Practitioners

This year is the 20th Anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which reflects the global commitment to the importance of women in building peace and security, and strong, inclusive societies. UNSCR 1325, and the nine UN resolutions that follow, recognize women’s central role in peace, security and stability; women’s right to be included in negotiations around war, peace and conflict resolution; and the importance of addressing the different needs of women and men in relief, recovery and post-conflict efforts.

Over the last several weeks, I met with several groups of international leaders visiting the U.S., all working in post-conflict countries to build peace and strengthen their countries’ institutions. Some of the participants were from urban areas; some from rural areas. Some are in government; some in civil society. These women and men — and many more like them — are key to efforts across the globe to make peace and security real in communities. Every day, they translate the rhetoric of the U.N. and governments to the lives of women, men, girls and boys. Their work defines and reflects the on-the-ground reality of this work.

Here are some key takeaways:

Every issue is relevant to women’s lives: Despite the global commitment of UNSCR 1325, we often hear that “women’s issues” will be dealt with once there is a peace agreement. That approach doesn’t work.When women are included in discussions and peace talks, women bring a broad set of issues and solutions to the table, and agreements last longer. The women I met over brought both policy expertise and knowledge of their communities. They were experts in criminal justice reform, environment and sustainability, and election systems. Their expertise, and the perspectives they bring, matters in terms of strong policy solutions and ensuring that everyone’s views are being considered.
Bringing women together who work on these issues is critically important. There are many lessons that women can learn from each other, from how to be an effective negotiator, how to represent community interests without being seen as partisan in peace negotiations, and how to engage men as part of these processes. It’s important that from various parts of the women, peace and security “ecosystem” understand how they complement each other’s roles: women in civil society raising issues and women in government drafting policies that bring those concerns and proposals to life.
Women doing this work to build peace don’t always see the connections to work elsewhere. The UNSCR resolutions around women, peace and security provide a global and local framework for thinking about these complex issues and for analyzing progress. But women on the ground don’t always see their work as connected to that framework, or see what they do as part of a global movement. Ensuring that their work is chronicled and captured helps them see these connections and helps international actors understand the connections as well.
Supporting peace builders is essential and we must listen to what these peace builders need from us. Local context and local leadership matters. It’s critical to listen to, and support, local leaders. Women and men engaged in peacebuilding and conflict resolution take many risks. They live in conflict zones and communities that have often been torn apart. They put their lives on the line, and they also push boundaries around about what is possible to resolve a conflict. Members of the international community need to support what they do, in whatever ways peacebuilders identify. In some cases, it may be highlighting their work publicly; in some cases not.
We ignore engaging men at our peril. Just as women are central to peace building and building strong post-conflict institutions, so are men. Many of the women I met with talked about what contributions they were making, but also how they work with men in their communities and countries to support women’s inclusion. Men need to be engaged so that they understand how communities can be rebuilt in a more equitable way following conflict.

As we mark these last 20 years, and recommit to engaging women in peace and security, we need to keep learning from those who make this work real every day. They bring international commitments and resolutions to life.

Reconciling Two Key Frameworks:
Feminist Foreign Policy and Women, Peace & Security

Introduction
There are currently two main frameworks regarding gender equality and women’s participation in international policy and conflict resolution: the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) framework, codified in the landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000, and the feminist
foreign policy framework (FFP) that became prominent in 2014 when Sweden became the first government to formally adopt a feminist foreign policy. Over the past decade, tension has existed between the civil society advocates who were/are involved in the development, passage, and implementation of UNSCR 1325 and those academics and practitioners who favor the newer feminist framework. Surprisingly (or not), an unpublished mapping exercise in 2019 between the two groups
found very few people who worked on both frameworks or who were using the WPS framework as a foundation for the newer FFP. We argue here that the goals of both frameworks—gender equality and peace—are the same and that the tension largely rests on differences in approach. This piece provides
background on both frameworks, what they have in common, some critiques, how they might approach current events, and recommendations on the way forward. We suggest that while these differences in approach are not insignificant, both frameworks would benefit from the greater acknowledgment
of and closer coordination with each other so that more progress can be made within the gender equality movement.

Background
Women, Peace and Security
The opening for ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),both in 1966, represented the heyday of human rights activity at the United Nations. Unfortunately, however, it was quickly realized that many of the countries that voted for those treaties had not assumed and did not recognize that the treaty provisions would also apply to women. Human rights were not inherently considered women’s rights. The United Nations subsequently followed up with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. Though, as of 2015, 189 countries have signed and ratified CEDAW (the United States signed but never ratified), many have done so with qualifications that render their commitments toothless. Hence, when First Lady Hillary Clinton declared, “human rights are women’s rights and women’s rights are human rights” at the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women, she stated what many had thought decades ago but had since come to understand as a continuing
battle.

Civil society groups continued to carry on the battle for gender equality through the United Nations, doing so not “just” as a matter of social justice but as a security issue. An increasing amount of case studies and empirically-based research demonstrated women’s multiple roles in security related affairs, the gendered differentiated effects of conflict on men, women, boys, and girls, and the linkage between
gender equality, stability, and good governance. Regrettably, social justice issues are often considered “desirable” though expendable issues on governmental agendas or “just too hard.” Security issues, however, tend to resonate more strongly with decision-makers. Ultimately, through the efforts of civil society groups, UNSCR 1325 was unanimously passed in 2000.

Implementation of UNSCR 1325 was left to states through National Action Plans (NAPs). As of 2021, 98 countries have adopted NAPs. Many of the early countries to adopt NAPs were Scandinavian countries already strong in gender equality. It took the United States 11 years to do so, finally accomplished while Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State. Of those countries with NAPs, only 36 percent have budgets attached, evidencing that the Women, Peace and Security framework has seen much more rhetorical than actual support in many countries.

The first iteration of the Women, Peace and Security Act in the United States was introduced in 2012. It was again initiated by a coalition of civil society organizations that championed the cause to bi-partisan congressional members and staffers. The Act was revised and reintroduced in both the 2013-2014
and 2015-2016 sessions of Congress, eventually gaining bipartisan sponsorship in both the House and the Senate. In 2017, the U.S. Congress passed the Women, Peace and Security Act. It was signed by President Donald Trump, making it the law of the land. Passage of the Act in 2017 was symbolically
important as it provided support for those in government seeking to take action regarding gender equality. It gave them a “hook” on which to hang actions. The Act also required the president to submit a government-wide implementation strategy to Congress. Initially, however, the Act was passed without funding attached. For a president who was confronted at the White House in 2017 by a crowd of protesting women estimated at three times the number who attended his inauguration, signing the Women, Peace and Security Act was a no-cost act of support for women.

After an implementation strategy for the Women, Peace and Security Act was delivered to Congress in 2019, the federal agencies charged with its execution (the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Homeland Security) began working on their own implementation strategies. The Defense Department, for example, outlined three objectives: 1) to exemplify a diverse organization that allows for women’s meaningful participation across the development, management, and employment of the Joint Force; 2) that women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors; and 3) that partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis. Regrettably, in many instances support has been slow and often more rhetorical and performative than actual, as indicated by budgets, policies, and women’s representation in decision-making roles. In performative allyship, those with privilege and position profess solidarity with a cause or policy, often to distance themselves from potential scrutiny or position themselves for praise. This vocalized support is disingenuous and potentially harmful to marginalized groups by signaling to subordinates that real action is neither needed nor sought and that no one will be held accountable for inaction. That makes active oversight by Congress imperative.

Feminist Foreign Policy
Feminist foreign policy theory was born of the theoretical ideas of ethical foreign policy and feminist international relations. It gained prominence in 2014 when the Swedish coalition government, led by Sweden’s Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, adopted a feminist foreign policy. In this first practical application, feminist foreign policy is posited on the conviction that sustainable peace, security, and development cannot be achieved if women, who comprise half the world’s population, are excluded. As the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s website states, “The policy is a response to the discrimination and systematic subordination that still characterizes everyday life for countless women and girls all over the world. Feminist foreign policy is an agenda for change to strengthen the rights, representation and resources of all women and girls.” Regarding rights, the Swedish Foreign Service promotes all women’s and girls’ full enjoyment of human rights, which includes combating all forms of violence and discrimination that restrict freedom of action. Regarding representation, the Swedish Foreign Service promotes women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels and in all
areas, and seeks dialogue with women representatives at all levels, including in civil society. With respect to resources, the Swedish Foreign Service works to ensure that government resources are allocated to promote gender equality and equal opportunities for all. In the first three years of implementation, Sweden worked to raise the visibility of and combat destructive masculine norms and to strengthen countries’ capacities to prosecute perpetrators, assist crime victims, and reintegrate soldiers. Sweden also contributed to a growing body of knowledge about the link between the uncontrolled spread of weapons and sexual violence against women.

Since 2014, several countries have announced different versions of a feminist foreign policy. Norway has developed both an Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy 2016-2020 and a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. Canada’s feminist International Assistance Policy, announced in 2017, targets gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls at its core: “This is a matter of basic justice and also basic economics. We know that empowering women, overseas and here at home, makes families and countries more prosperous.” The French government’s feminist foreign policy, adopted in 2019, says that gender equality should be considered in all issues, from poverty reduction to sustainable development, peace and security, defense and promotion of fundamental rights, and climate and economic issues. Other countries have followed suit (Mexico in 2020, Luxembourg in 2021, Spain in 2021, and Germany in 2022).

In addition, there are discussions about incorporating a feminist approach to foreign policy taking place in the European Union, Chile, Denmark, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Governments, however, are many-armed creatures, sometimes with activities of one arm having no relation to another. Interest in or adoption of a feminist foreign policy
does not inherently mean a gender-equal society or even full government support of women. Mexico, for example, has expressed interest in a feminist foreign policy, though it has one of the highest global rates of violence against women. The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), a non-profit center headquartered in Washington, D.C., hosts both the Coalition for a Feminist Foreign Policy in the United States and the Global Partner Network, which consists of more than 30 governments and leading civil society groups who are working to advance the field of feminist foreign policy. The working definition the Coalition for a Feminist Foreign Policy in the United States uses for feminist foreign policy: “Feminist foreign policy is the policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states, as well as movements and other non-state actors, in a manner that prioritizes peace, gender equality, and environmental integrity; enshrines, promotes, and protects the human rights of all; seeks to disrupt colonial, racist, patriarchal and male-dominated power structures; and allocates significant resources, including research, to achieve that vision. Feminist foreign policy is coherent in its approach across all its levers of influence, anchored by the exercise of those values at home and co-created with feminist activists, groups, and movements, at home and abroad.”

In 2020, ICRW separately released a global framework for feminist foreign policy that was developed following more than a year of research and global consultations with over 100 organizations in more than 40 countries. In order to inform the fledgling field of feminist foreign policy, this framework attempts to provide an outline, including five key ingredients necessary for countries considering a feminist foreign policy: the purpose of the policy within the government’s specific context; the definition of feminist foreign policy for the government; the scope or reach of the policy (what parts of the government will be impacted?); the intended outcomes of the policy and benchmarks to achieve over time; and a government plan to operationalize it.

Commonalities and Critiques
While there are differences in the WPS and FFP frameworks, both seek to expand global peace and security, increase women’s participation and leadership, integrate gender into humanitarian responses, and change the political and governance structures that reinforce gender inequality.

Peace and Security
One significant commonality between the WPS and FFP frameworks is a redefinition of the concepts of peace and security. Norwegian peace activist Johan Galtung first differentiated negative peace and positive peace in the 1960s. Negative peace is defined as the absence of violence without a society’s tendencies toward harmony and stability, whereas positive peace is more lasting and built on sustainable investments in economic development and institutions and characterized by societal attitudes that foster peace. WPS exemplifies positive peace through inclusiveness and consideration of gendered perspectives of policies and programs that lead to increased stability of all political orders. Yet a critique of the WPS framework is its focus on the protection of women and girls. The argument is that the WPS framework not only solidifies the militarized state but, in some cases, provides justification for conflict. The U.S.-led War on Terror, for example, was at least in part framed as a “fight for the rights and dignity of women.” University of Sydney Professor Laura Shepherd argues that multiple logics behind the “prevention” pillar—a logic of peace, a logic of militarism, and a logic of security—creates a paradox that “collapses back into a logic of security” contrary to the ultimate goal of peace. That is, in order to have peace, security must be obtained and retained through a heavy military presence and potentially military action, thus justifying such.

In a similar vein, feminist foreign policy seeks to change the very definition of “security” to go beyond the absence of armed conflict to include economic and political security, freedom from a fear of a global pandemic and climate change, and the feeling of safety within one’s community and home. The “security” issues discussed in FPP would be broadened to include access to drinkable water, the ability to walk home at night safely, the number of weapons in a country outside of the military, and many others. Likewise, the solutions considered would be more diverse. Data used to make those decisions would include information about human rights abuses, rates of child marriage, levels of gender-based violence, and other issues that Texas A&M Professor Valerie Hudson and other scholars have pointed to in several publications that show the connection between gender equality and state stability. Decisions made to protect the interests of a country would cover not only military personnel but civilians on all sides. The voices of those impacted by military activities, sanctions, or other actions would be included. In response, WPS advocates argue that working first on the protection of women, girls, and other vulnerable groups is a necessary precondition to inclusive gender equality and diversity. Women’s safety—the goal of protection—is necessary to ensure that women and girls have the ability to work toward other goals of economic and political power and can use their agency to shape their lives.

Women’s Representation
To reach the goals of gender equality and peace, both the WPS and FFP frameworks aim to increase the representation of women in country and global policy-making processes and activities. One of the four core pillars of the Women, Peace and Security framework focuses on the increased participation of women at all levels of decision-making in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and in post-conflict relief and recovery efforts. But the WPS framework works within conventional peacemaking and post-conflict governance structures that accept conflict as inevitable. Subsequently, this framework has been criticized by Melbourne Law School Professor Dianne Otto, who argues that “the WPS agenda has served to refocus feminist attention from … making armed conflict impossible, to making armed conflict safer for women … as an end in itself.” Thereby, WPS can be perceived as a more incremental approach to positive peace, whereas FFP is more transformational. Like WPS, the goal of FFP is to increase the number of women serving in elected and non-elected political and government positions, in peace processes, in military and peacekeeping missions, and in development and humanitarian activities. FFP seeks to increase the number of feminist voices that will advocate for gender equality in all sectors, beyond peace and security, such as in the economy and climate adaptation, including a country’s own government as well as its government partners. A critique of this approach is that feminist foreign policy is too broad; it can’t just add more women and change everything all at one time—change requires incrementalism. The real-world implications of executing a feminist foreign policy are complicated. For instance, in Sweden, even with female leadership and a feminist foreign policy, the government has struggled to find a balance between human rights and its own arms industry.

Post-conflict and Humanitarian Settings
UNSCR 1325 urges local actors, Member States, and UN agencies to adopt gendered perspectives in peace operations, negotiations, and agreements, in acknowledgement that policies and programs affect men, women, boys and girls differently, and to include women in the resolution and recovery phase of conflict. It identifies women as active agents rather than passive recipients. This is important because it
identifies women’s participation as a right, not something that men are giving women out of goodwill, and as a post-conflict benefit to all parties. Research has shown that including women in peace negotiations increases the potential of peace agreement lasting two or more years by 20 percent, and
increases by 35 percent the probability of peace agreements lasting 15 years or longer.18 Additionally, including women starts to erode the idea of women as weak, meaning that the feminine will no longer be synonymous with weakness and fragility. The resolution empowers women and allows them to demand that they are heard and incorporated into processes at all levels.19 The critique here is that the considerations of women and girls are rarely included in peace negotiations and simply haven’t been taken into account, and that there is no mechanism for holding countries or other implementing
organizations accountable for including women and gendered perspectives in peace negotiations.

Similarly, the FFP framework calls for a feminist approach to humanitarian response that at its core centers the experience of women and people subjected to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination. This focus highlights a wider array of concerns than considered in traditional paradigms, including the threat of gender-based violence, access to sexual and reproductive health, access to education, and the burden of unpaid care responsibilities in times of crisis. It urges the U.S.
government to take steps to change its humanitarian approach and push for change throughout the global humanitarian system.

Institutional Change
Both frameworks agree that reframing the discussion of peace and security involves shaking the very foundations of the patriarchy, a system that until recently was the exclusive purview of men and that deploys decision-making power through warlords, political elites, government, security communities, and the intricately linked military-industrial machine. Within the WPS framework, protection does not inherently or exclusively refer to women being physically (or in any other way) protected by men. It does, however, recognize that there are individuals made vulnerable through cultural, political, legal, economic, gender-related, and sexual orientation structures. It creates agency because it is only through agency that women will have the opportunity to participate in the kind of preventive actions that can lead to positive peace.

In response, FFP advocates would argue that this approach is too focused on the individual rather than the system. The FFP framework seeks to change the institutions and processes themselves. It wants to diversify more than just the voices in the room; it wants to expand the information collected, analysis conducted, and solutions considered to go beyond the traditional decision-making process. This strategy covers defense, development, and diplomacy programs conducted in other countries and how governments operate internally. Resources, both in terms of budget allocations and human investments, would be redistributed to reflect governments’ different priorities. Less would be spent on weapons and more would be spent on human infrastructure; more would go to multilateral organizations and those focused on global goals. WPS critics would say that even with provisions for structural agency, the entrenched nature of those in power through cultural norms and expectations forces a process of slower, more incremental change.

Applying WPS and FPP to Current Challenges
Democracy
In 2021, the annual Democracy Index found that less than ten percent of countries worldwide were considered “full democracies” and rated the United States a “flawed democracy” for the fifth year in a row. Though countries leaning toward populism and authoritarianism vary in many aspects, what they share are leaders who identify as rebels, bullies, and tough guys who flaunt authority, disregard civility, and encourage others to do so as well, such as Presidents Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, and Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines. Further, as American journalist Peter Beinart pointed out, authoritarian leaders “use gender to discredit one political order and validate another.”20 Many have targeted women, individually or as a group, as their evil-elite punching bags.

To address this issue, the WPS framework would return to concepts within UNSCR 1325 that have been fleshed out through nine additional security council resolutions: participation of women in all levels of decision-making, protection from sexual and gender-based violence, prevention of violence, and advancement of relief and recovery measures. Within this context, FFP would go beyond a focus on increasing individual women’s political participation to disrupt the colonial, racist, patriarchal, and
male-dominated power structures. It would support human rights activists and civil society organizations engaged in women’s rights movements globally, alter patriarchal political institutions, including parties and parliaments, and address issues such as violence against women in politics that serve as barriers to women serving in public life.

Reproductive Rights
Five years ago, the United States was considered a global leader in women’s reproductive rights, considered a critical aspect of women’s agency, but during the Trump administration became a global outliner with deep regression in that area. The Biden-Harris administration took several key actions to
advance sexual and reproductive health and rights in its first year, trying to reverse the Trump administration rollback. In his second week in office, President Biden issued an executive
memorandum on women’s health at home and abroad which stated that it is the policy of the U.S. government to support sexual and reproductive health and rights. It rescinded the global gag rule, withdrew the United States from the so-called Geneva Consensus Declaration, and directed the U.S. Secretary of State to restore funding for United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).2 But, based on the leaked Alito-authored draft court decision, Trump-appointed conservative Supreme Court justices appear ready to take American women’s reproductive rights back to the 1970s by overturning Roe v Wade (1973). The implications are staggering, not just regarding reproductive rights but further indicating the U.S. is moving away from democratic rule to populist authoritarianism.

The WPS framework does not address reproductive rights or abortion in UNSCR 1325 or in any of the subsequent resolutions or in the U.S. Women, Peace and Security Act. Feminist Foreign Policy, on the other hand, includes bodily autonomy and freedom from discrimination, violence, coercion, exploitation, and abuse as a key tenet. And while the current U.S. administration has taken steps to stop or reverse U.S. government backsliding on the issue, including potentially after the judicial demise of Roe v Wade, FFP advocates continue to push for more, such as a permanent repeal of the global gag rule, also known as the Mexico City Policy.

Conclusion
While differences in approach for WPS and FFP are not insignificant, both frameworks would benefit from closer coordination with the other.

Five years after the passage of the WPS Act in the United States, with the subsequent government-wide 2019 strategy and departmental strategies now in place, incremental progress in implementing the WPS framework is evident. Funding is being approved and allocated, for example, to offer meetings, workshops, and courses on Women, Peace and Security to members of security communities from many other countries, both in the U.S. and abroad. Those who participate in these events (men and women) say that attendance, and the gender push for gender empowerment from U.S. organizations, including the military, are making a slow but positive difference in their militaries and countries. A Women, Peace and Security Congressional Caucus was formed in 2020. Its focus is “to ensure that progress towards women’s empowerment and inclusion is a strong priority of U.S. foreign policy.” Efforts of the Caucus have included receiving briefs from various departments on their efforts to implement the Women, Peace and Security framework and expressing support for women in Afghanistan during the evacuation operations in 2021. Ensuring progress of the WPS Act, at home and abroad, requires proactive measures and holding those responsible for implementation accountable.

As this work continues, those pressing the U.S. government to adopt a feminist foreign policy need to acknowledge the work of those who developed and implemented the WPS Act. That legislation took more than a decade to be created and passed in a bipartisan fashion. Newer actors in this space might benefit by engaging with the activists who started their work around the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and then focused on the UN Security Council before turning to country-specific NAPs and legislation. There must be lessons learned about Hill staff and member relationships, allies in non-traditional departments and offices, effective messages, and budget strategies that have worked.

Moreover, the combined community can work together to increase women’s representation in U.S. foreign policy through the Leadership Council for Women in National Security (LCWINS), WIIS, the Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, or the Coalition for a Feminist Foreign Policy in the United States. Research and advocacy must continue to make the link between both frameworks
and the promotion of democracy. And both WPS and FFP advocates can continue to push for the integration of the needs of women and girls in humanitarian and post-conflict settings and programs.

So far, however, Women, Peace and Security framework implementation seems to have remained focused on work done or to be done “over there,” wherever outside of the United States that happens to be, neglecting the important point that there are internal as well as external components to WPS. Similarly, one of the core principles of FFP is that there is coherence across all aspects of foreign policy that extends across domestic and foreign policy, with both realms embracing the same feminist values. That means structural and cultural constraints to gender empowerment within U.S. institutions must also be addressed. For example, while women in the military are no longer denied access to combat positions, they still do not receive the same encouragement and support necessary for success to join those previously prohibited positions as men do.

While differences in approach for WPS and FFP are not insignificant, both frameworks would benefit from closer coordination with the other. There are many opportunities to support the work of the other, as much progress is still needed in the United States and globally to reach gender equality, women’s empowerment, and a safer world.

This paper was co-authored by Joan Johnson-Freese and originally published as a Women In International Security policy brief.

A Laser Focus on Women’s Rights Is Key to Sustainable Afghan Peace

As the U.S. withdraws troops from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden has vowed to continue support for Afghan women and girls “by maintaining significant humanitarian and development assistance.” Further, on a visit to Afghanistan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken firmly stated that the U.S. will continue to advocate “for equal rights for women, including their meaningful participation in the ongoing negotiations and their equal representation throughout society.” The importance of this focus is highlighted by the recent horrific attack on a school in Kabul, killing 50 people, many of them women and girls.

The Women, Peace, and Security Act (WPS Act), enacted in 2017, commits the United States to increase the participation of women in peacekeeping and security operations, and to support the inclusion of female negotiators, meditators, and peacebuilders around the world.

The WPS Act is critical to fulfilling the U.S. commitment to women and women’s rights in Afghanistan. It is important for the United States to use all possible tools in this regard, given the difficulties and uncertainty of a lasting and equitable peace with the Taliban. That includes continued support for the four women who are part of the Afghan government delegation to peace negotiations: Habiba Sarabi, former governor of Bamiyan province; Fatima Gailani, president of the Afghan Crescent Society; Sharifa Zurmati Wardak, a journalist and former member of the Afghan Independent Election Commission; and Fawzia Koofi, a member of the Afghan Parliament. They are emblematic of women leaders and advocates in Afghanistan: smart, committed, and dedicated to building a strong future for all Afghans.

There is ample evidence that when women participate in peace talks, outcomes are more sustainable. When women are engaged in peace processes, peace agreements are 35 percent more likely to last at least 15 years.

I have seen firsthand the impact of women’s leadership across Afghan society. From 2012 to 2013, I served at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, where I focused on women and civil society, and traveled extensively to work with individuals and organizations advancing the role of women in Afghan society. I met women and girls all over the country, working to build a stronger and more equitable society. They were teachers, businesswomen, journalists, civil society activists, health care workers, students, and government employees. Afghan women have been key players in reshaping Afghan society, building on their history. These women have been advocates throughout the lengthy process of engaging with the Taliban for a ceasefire and for protecting fundamental rights.

However, the presence of the four women alone in the Afghan delegation is not enough to protect women’s rights.

Two more actions can demonstrate the seriousness of the U.S. commitment. First, officials at the highest levels must be laser-focused on the end result of peace negotiations: an agreement that preserves women’s rights. The Biden administration must ensure that any accord has strong provisions that guarantee Afghan women a role in shaping their society. Without such a framework, it is unclear how the United States and other international actors could support an agreement. This means continued diplomatic and development support for women in civil society, media, the private sector, and the public sector. It includes continuing work to ensure that legal frameworks are respected and that policies ensuring the rights of women and girls — whether about access to finance, education, or health — are implemented.

Gender Analysis

Second, every plank of a proposed agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban must be analyzed with a gender lens. Amid a process that will reshape Afghanistan’s policy and legal framework for years to come, it is essential to understand the differential impact policies have on women and men, girls and boys.

Using a gender analysis on all aspects of any agreement is important. We often think about access to education or health as the only issues that impact women and girls, but every issue that is the subject of such a negotiation has an impact on women and girls, whether in terms of security, access to services, or demobilization of radical fighters.

Gender analysis looks at quantitative and qualitative information to identify, understand, and explain differences in impact between people because of an individual’s identity. It can examine such differences that exist (or do not) on:

access to and control over assets, resources, opportunities, and services, including education;
access to and control over technology and the internet;
constraints, opportunities, and entry points for leadership roles and decision-making;
prevalence and impact of violence; and
potential differential impacts of development policies and programs, including unintended or negative consequences.

This type of analysis takes into account how women and men live and work, how they support their families and communities, and the constraints that they are under in doing so. For example, a 2012 study by the U.S. Agency for International Development with the Afghan Women’s Capacity Building Organization found that 80 percent of Afghan women have access to a cell phone, almost half owning their own, many of them having acquired it recently and many of them younger women, indicating access was increasing rapidly. But of those who didn’t own a phone, more than half cited “lack of permission from family members as a major obstacle to acquiring one.” That means it is still harder for women to access information. According to a recent gender analysis conducted by CARE, , 45 percent of Afghan women cannot access adequate information about COVID-19, thereby reinforcing existing health disparities.

One way to ensure that this gender analysis is completed in a systematic manner is to embed at least one gender advisor in the U.S. and Afghan delegations. Gender advisors are essential to effective policy and program development. Effective gender advisors have the technical skills, competencies, and experience necessary to provide appropriate, in-depth guidance to integrate a gender lens, and a gender analysis, throughout the process of policy formulation and program development.

Afghan Women Negotiators Urge Representation and Aid Conditions

Afghan women negotiators like Fawzia Koofi and others have asked the U.S. and other international partners to vigorously pursue at least two specific objectives that could at least provide some measure of security and empowerment for women in Afghanistan’s future. First, that they press both the Afghan government and the Taliban to reserve at least 30 percent of elected seats and appointments in Afghan political institutions for women. Second, that international aid to Afghanistan be conditioned on protecting the constitutional role of women in Afghanistan’s governing institutions. Conditioning aid to the Afghan government might provide a very real incentive to ensure women’s rights are protected both on paper and in reality. These are key demands.

In the United States, there is a bipartisan commitment on Capitol Hill to protect the hard-fought gains that women and girls have made since the fall of the Taliban government 20 years ago. Senators Menendez (D-NJ) and Risch (R-ID), the leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, both expressed their concerns about the impact of the U.S. decision to withdraw on women and girls.

Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Joni Ernst (R-IA) just introduced a bill to protect Afghan women and girls after the U.S. military withdraws. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), the only woman on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has consistently raised the impact of U.S. policy on Afghan women and girls. She was instrumental in the declassification of a National Intelligence Council memo that sets out concerns about the continued rigidity of the Taliban’s views of the role of women and girls, though it also suggests possible opportunities for internal and external pressure that might moderate its policies.

As the process of U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan continues over the coming months, it is essential that the Biden administration ensures that Afghan women are part of the peace process and that every issue in the negotiations is analyzed with an eye towards gender equality and women’s rights.

This column originally appeared in Just Security.

Is U.S. Foreign Policy Feminist?

This is a year of milestones for women: the 25th Anniversary of the Beijing Conference on Women, the 20th Anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and the 100th Anniversary of women’s suffrage in the United States. In this context, Our Secure Future commissioned a poll of 1,500 registered voters in the U.S. to get a sense of how they view foreign policy decision-makers, whether they see themselves represented in that arena, and whether they consider themselves to be a feminist. The results illuminate some thinking on these issues and are useful to decision-makers and advocates alike as they develop and debate foreign and national security policy.

According to the poll, almost 60 percent of respondents do NOT think that those who have made U.S. foreign policy and national security decisions over the last decade generally share their beliefs and interests. 22 percent were unsure. Here are some more details:

There was a gap between women (55%) and men (64%).
There was a wider gap between Democrats (50%) and Republicans (67%)/Independents (64%).
There was an even wider gap between those who frequently watch MSNBC (44%) and Fox News (68%).
Surprisingly, a greater percentage of white respondents (62%) do not feel represented in U.S. foreign policy and national security institutions than black (49%) or Hispanic (51%) respondents.

The same poll showed that less than half (48%) of those surveyed think that women are sufficiently represented in the U.S. government when it comes to making decisions about foreign policy and national security. Additional details:

The largest gap was based on political party affiliation with 10 percent of Democrats and 73 percent of Republicans believing that women are sufficiently represented. Independents were split (42% yes/41% no)
There was also a gap between women (35%) and men (44%).
The widest gap was between those who frequently watch MSNBC (5%) and Fox News (74%).

The survey also found that party affiliation and age were affiliated with whether a respondent thinks of her/himself as a “feminist”.

59 percent of Democrats said they consider themselves a feminist (62% for frequent MSNBC viewers), but just 7 percent of Republicans and frequent Fox News viewers did.
50 percent of 18-34 year-olds said “yes” to the feminist label while 29 percent of those over 65 years did.
Black (47%) and Hispanic (49%) respondents were more likely to think of themselves as feminists than white ones (30%).

This information — while preliminary — can help guide discussions and provide background for work being done to advance policy proposals around Women, Peace and Security, and a more inclusive foreign policy.

Women Must Be Part of the Afghan Peace Process

Afghan women are leaders. They are central to building strong Afghan institutions and legal frameworks and creating opportunity for all Afghans. The current U.S. peace envoy, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, would be well served to call on them, and their expertise, as he seeks an elusive peace in Afghanistan.

As part of any dialogue and debate about the future of Afghanistan, it is critical that the Afghan government, and Afghan citizens, be genuinely engaged in the process. This is not a process that should be reserved for the United States, some Afghan politicians, and the Taliban.

Broadly speaking, engaging Afghans means ensuring that there is genuine consultation with those who comprise today’s Afghanistan: men and women, young and old, people from every ethnic group and sector of society. Afghan power brokers have a role to play but they aren’t the only voice that must be heard. The Taliban do not represent the majority of Afghans, and their efforts to be seen as modern, and moderate, are questionable. For example, reports are that in districts controlled by the Taliban today, girls’ secondary schools are not operating and women cannot go to markets on their own.

Afghan women have made tremendous strides based on international investments and their own tenacity and agency. They are not victims, but leaders and change makers. They have been at the forefront of building a strong economy and a broad-based education system, and promoting the leadership of women across sectors.

It is critical that Afghan women are fully engaged and that their experience, talent, and expertise is brought to bear on all parts of the Afghan peace processes. To date, Afghan women have been generally excluded from the current talks. In a hopeful sign, earlier this week in Kabul, Khalilzad met with representatives of the Afghan Women’s Network, a coalition of 125 women’s rights organizations. At that meeting, he said that “women must be at the table during all negotiations about peace and Afghanistan’s future.” This is in line with the mandate of the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 which recognizes, as a matter of U.S.policy, the importance of women’s roles in peace negotiations and conflict resolution.

Research demonstrates that when women are engaged in peace talks, a peace agreement is 64 percent less likely to fail. The meaningful inclusion of women in peace processes increases by 35 percent the probability of an agreement lasting at least 15 years. This is in contrast to the overall durability of agreements that end conflict, with peace lasting only five years on average once conflict ends.

Engaging women in the peace process is about more than institutionalizing the tremendous progress Afghan women and girls have made. Although, the legal status of women and statistics are impressive. Increased access to education for girls is one of the most significant achievements since the defeat of the Taliban. Fifteen years ago, fewer than 5,000 girls were enrolled in primary school. Today, estimates are that three million girls are in primary school. Secondary schools have graduated at least 120,000 girls, and at least 15,000 have completed college. 36 percent of teachers are women. 6,000 women are judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, police officers, and soldiers. In government, as of early 2019, women hold 69 of 249 seats in parliament. Of 25 government ministers, four are women. Twelve of the 63 members of the Afghan High Peace Council are women. About 3,000 businesses in the country are owned and operated by women entrepreneurs.

Engaging women in the peace process is about tapping the expertise and legitimacy of Afghan women. These women have expertise in creating jobs, building a strong legal framework, and engaging large groups of Afghans in dialogue. For example, the Afghan Women’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry brings together women business owners from different sectors to advocate for legal reforms that open economic opportunities. Women for Afghan Women runs shelters for those who have been subject to gender-based violence and helps them navigate the legal system.

These women, and many more like them, have been involved in building their communities for years. They understand the situation on the ground in a way that is critical to a peace agreement that protects the rights of women and girls, and also reintegrates Taliban fighters and their sympathizers into the fabric of Afghan society

A stable, prosperous and secure Afghanistan is critical for everyone. Afghan women must speak for themselves, and for their fellow citizens, as part of the current dialogues.

Women Mediating Peace Talks: A Long Road to Parity

Last week, I was at Durham University in a setting made for a Harry Potter movie. I was there for an expert meeting on increasing the number of women high-level mediators, or special envoys, in peace negotiations led by the United Nations or other regional bodies. Between 1991 and 2011, the UN tracked 31 negotiations, and you can literally count the number of women chief mediators on one hand. At the same time, women have played other high-level mediation roles globally, as well as significant roles in conflict mediation at local levels, often negotiating safe passage for access to humanitarian assistance.

Increased global stability is inextricably tied to greater numbers of women mediators, negotiators, signatories and witnesses to peace talks. Women’s participation translates to more durable and longer lasting agreements. When women are engaged in the process, agreements are 64 percent less likely to fail, and 35 percent more likely to last 15 years.

This gathering comes at a critical time. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is committed to increase the UN’s emphasis on conflict prevention and mediation and the number of women who serve in these roles globally. Over the last two years, three regional networks of women mediators have launched: a Nordic network, an African network and a Mediterranean network. We’ve seen more women negotiators, representing parties to conflict. In the Colombia peace process, women comprised 33 percent of negotiators overall, with women on both the government and FARC teams. And, there was a Gender Subcommission to review proposals and agreements. Here in the U.S., the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017 has just been signed into law.

Here are my takeaways and lessons learned:

1) Political will supporting women special envoys is critical. Special envoys are usually former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, or high-level diplomats, with strong political connections and diplomatic skills, and who are acceptable to parties to the conflict. There are enough women with experience and expertise to fill these roles. Governments and the international community need to be clear in advocating for specific women and publicly supporting those appointments.

2) UN Security Council Resolutions committing to more women mediators aren’t enough. There must be more action. Countries need to take concrete actions, such as enacting legislation (like the US Women, Peace & Security Act), signaling to those with responsibility that they are expected to nominate women, and ensuring that National Action Plans for Women, Peace and Security commit to increase women’s participation as mediators (only the NAPs of Ghana, Rwanda and Sweden do so).

3) The UN should provide incentives to countries that nominate women. Countries should put forward women who meet the criteria for these roles, including former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and high-level diplomats. Those at the UN with responsibility for receiving nominations can request gender balanced slates of nominees, require an explanation when slates do not have gender parity, and give more consideration to those on slates that do.

4) Networks of women mediators provide a pipeline. These networks span several regions and are growing. Many of the members are ready to serve as special envoys or high-level members of their teams. Identifying these women and ensuring they are on both formal and informal rosters is key to increasing their visibility, highlighting their suitability and providing access to key meetings and forums. Networks can also provide platforms for knowledge sharing and, if necessary, coaching to deepen skills.

5) We should broaden who we consider for service as a special envoy. In addition to the types of people who have served to date, we should also look at those who have mediated trade disputes, or those who have served as mediators in judicial settings. There are many women in these roles globally, with strong and tested dispute resolution skills.

Bottom line, there are women who can fill these roles. We have a Secretary-General committed to action, and it’s on all of us to make this a reality.

Q&A Angelic Young: Women Fundamental to Peace & Conflict Resolution

Over fifty percent of peace agreements fail within 5 years. But when women participate, agreements last anywhere from two to 15 years longer. Planning for women’s substantive engagement is fundamental to conflict resolution, mitigation and prevention. National Action Plans (NAPs) are a tool that governments can use to do just that. They make real the global commitment to women leading in peace processes, as set forth in UN Security Council Resolutions, starting with UNSCR 1325 (2000).

I recently spoke with Angelic Young, Director of National Action Plans at the Washington, DC-based Institute for Inclusive Security. Angelic is an expert on NAPs, how they work and the difference they make.

FOSTER: Why are National Action Plans important?

YOUNG: High-impact NAPs – detailed strategies created through an inclusive, consultative process – prompt meaningful changes in behavior, policies, and funding. They help hold governments accountable for promises and increase transparency.

Such strategies are a roadmap, taking us from Step A – acknowledging that women are not regularly included in formal peace negotiations — to Step Z – women are leading peace processes. It’s easy to agree that women should be included in decision-making; it’s another to map out how to get there. NAPs matter because they help us understand what intermediate actions will lead to better peace and security. Many countries have committed to reducing the gender gap, but more than 90% of countries with NAPs have made progress in doing so – and that’s significant.

FOSTER: Is there a common reason governments commit to a NAP?

YOUNG: There have been several waves of NAP development, and reasons vary. Some governments do this to demonstrate their commitment to democratic governance, human rights and rule of law to the international community. Others, especially those on their second, third or even fourth NAP, prioritize these plans because they consider advancing the status of women and girls integral to foreign policy and national security. Others use them to address very specific internal challenges. There isn’t a common reason, and I think that’s a good thing. NAPs ought to be adjusted to meet the specific needs dictated by the country context.

FOSTER: What is a good example of a NAP process? What is civil society’s role?

YOUNG: When a country is on the path to a high-impact NAP, they’ve addressed six key pillars: political will; design; coordination; civil society; monitoring and evaluation; and resources.

The gold standard is a NAP that is visibly supported by key leaders throughout the government, preceded by a needs assessment and designed in collaboration with civil society. It will have a defined mechanism for how activities will be coordinated across sectors, a monitoring and evaluation strategy for tracking both short and long-term results and dedicated budget.

I’ve yet to see a NAP that consistently meets the “gold” standard across all six pillars. There are still plenty that lack budgets and strategies for monitoring and evaluation. There’s an assumption, especially in countries with outwardly focused NAPs (e.g., countries providing foreign assistance to countries or regions experiencing conflict, rather than in conflict themselves), that there’s no need for a specific line item budget. Or, that monitoring and evaluation is just too difficult. Both are dangerous assumptions, in my experience, and lead to NAPs that are under-resourced and difficult to measure.

Inclusion of civil society is vital. For the past year or so, I’ve been providing technical support to the Jordanian National Commission for Women as Jordan launches its first NAP. JNCW began by establishing a National Coalition for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325, which consists of government, military and civil society. Civil society has been integral to NAP design from the beginning, and have helped ensure that the plan has clear priorities, timeframes, accountability measures and realistic budget.

FOSTER: Why should non-conflict or post-conflict countries develop a NAP?

YOUNG: Great question, and one I hear quite frequently. Resolution 1325 is often interpreted as only applying to countries directly affected by conflict, but in fact, it applies to ANY efforts to maintain and promote peace and security. That can include daily operations of a police force in a stable country, or contributions to peacekeeping. It can include care for refugees fleeing conflict. Peace and security is a globally shared responsibility. While a NAP in a country not directly affected by conflict might look different from a NAP in a country recovering from conflict, both are vital.

FOSTER: What about the U.S. NAP?

YOUNG: I have mixed emotions about the U.S. NAP. I was at the State Department when the NAP was first developed, so I have the experience being on the inside, and appreciate how challenging it is to create a strategy for the mammoth structure that is the U.S. government.

Still, if I’m perfectly objective, there are gaps. On the plus side, the U.S. NAP aligns well with U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities. Though I wish there was a more formal mechanism (like that in Jordan), the USG regularly solicits civil society input.

On the other hand, political will is inconsistent across agencies. The USG could also do better at engaging mid-level leaders. I’ve seen this with many similar strategies; you’ll have top-level cover, so to speak, and great support at the working level – but mid-level managers aren’t as involved as they ought to be; and they are key. The USG also lacks a formal coordination mechanism – my sense (from the outside) is that coordination happens on the backs of incredibly dedicated individuals; but there’s no enduring structure.

The two biggest concerns are monitoring and evaluation and resources. Measuring progress is complicated for the US, not the least because each agency takes different approaches to tracking performance. Still, a monitoring and evaluation strategy could help with this challenge, and I would like to see the US commit to creating one.

The largest issue is that there is no line-item budget. Without this, and in my experience, it means that vital training initiatives an agency might undertake can’t happen because there’s no money. It means that there aren’t dedicated NAP focal points in every sub-organization within every agency, because there’s no money for dedicated billets. I think the USG has done a remarkable job considering the lack of resources, but it’s quite disappointing that we don’t match our public posture with actual dollars.

FOSTER: Thank you.